

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

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DRAFTED BY ACDA/PAB:RFIREHOCK

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:RMILLER

ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH (SUB)

UR/RPM:VLEHOVICH

PM/DCA:VBAKER

JCS:COL.LAFFERTY

DOD:LMICHAEL

SC:DAARON (SUB)

S/S - MR. GAMMON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 245599

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: GUIDANCE ON SPC VERIFICATION REPORT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON EARLIER SPC DRAFT, TRANSMITTED USNATO 5709, AND DISCUSSION OF THAT TEXT TRANSMITTED USNATO 5856, WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE OF USE FOR DEC. 17 SPC MEETING. OUR VIEWS ON LATEST SPC DRAFT IN PREPARATION.

2. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (PARA 1, NATO 5856) WE WOULD
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PREFER TO DAMPEN DISCUSSIONS OF THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF

US SHARING AND TO AVOID DISCUSSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALLIES WILL, FROM TIME TO TIME, CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THIS ISSUE.

3. STAFFING (PARA 2, USNATO 5856) AS DISCUSSED IN US PAPER ON INSPECTION OPTIONS, WE PREFER RESTRICTING THE MEMBERSHIP OF INSPECTION TEAMS TO COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. AS BETWEEN NATIONAL TEAMS AND NATO TEAMS, NATO TEAMS OF MIXED NATIONALITY MIGHT SIMPLIFY DISTRIBUTION OF INSPECTION EFFORT AND PERMIT SHARING OF LOGISTICAL COSTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, NATIONAL TEAMS WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. IN EITHER CASE A MECHANISM FOR CENTRALIZED DIRECTION AND INFORMATION SHARING WOULD BE NEEDED.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING OFFICERS OF THE HOST COUNTRY ON INSPECTION TEAMS, WE WOULD PREFER FOR THE SAKE OF EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS THAT TEAMS BE COMPOSED OF ADVERSARY INSPECTORS. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MLMS, LIAISON OFFICERS SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THE TEAMS, LEAVING THE INSPECTORS MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE NECESSARY LIAISON BETWEEN THE INSPECTORATES AND EACH HOST COUNTRY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND HANDLING DIFFICULTIES SHOULD BE AT A HEADQUARTERS RATHER THAN FIELD LEVEL.

5. WE DO NOT PRESENTLY ANTICIPATE INSPECTORATES OPERATING OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE COLLATERAL MEASURES OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS EXTENDING BEYOND THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS (SEE PARAS 6 AND 7 BELOW).

6. WE THINK IT UNNECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MOVE BEYOND THESE BROAD GENERAL STAFFING CONSIDERATIONS AT PRESENT, AND ANY QUESTIONS SUCH AS MIX OF INSPECTORS FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES, ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, OR SPECIFIC TASKING ARRANGEMENTS CAN LOGICALLY BE DEFERRED UNTIL LATER.

7. COLLATERAL MEASURES (PARA 3 USNATO 5856). AS YOU INDICATE, MAJOR US CONCERN IS VERIFYING THE REDUCTION
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ASPECT OF ANY AGREEMENT. WHATEVER COLLATERAL MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED WILL, INTER ALIA, CONTRIBUTE TO OUR ABILITY TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH FORCE LEVELS. WE WOULD OF COURSE BE ALERT TO VIOLATIONS OF STABILIZING MEASURES, BUT DO NOT SEE THEM AS COMPRISING A SEPARATE CATEGORY FOR INSPECTION COEQUAL WITH FORCE LEVELS.

8. WHATEVER VERIFICATION SYSTEM IS AGREED TO--NATIONAL

MEANS ALONE OR NATIONAL MEANS AND NEGOTIATED INSPECTION--
WILL ENCOMPASS MONITORING THE OBSERVANCE OF COLLATERAL
MEASURES TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO MEASURE COMPLIANCE,
INCREASE CONFIDENCE, AND ENHANCE SECURITY. BECAUSE SPECIFIC
STABILIZING MEASURES HAVE NOT BEEN AGREED UPON IN ANY
DETAIL--WE PREFER TO AVOID A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO
VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION.

9. SPECIFIC MEASURES (PARA 4 USNATO 5856). THE WORKING
GROUP'S APPARENT CONCLUSION--AN INSPECTION SYSTEM SHOULD
BE COMPRISED OF A LITTLE BIT OF EVERYTHING--IS WORTH
REEXAMINING. ALTHOUGH THE INDIVIDUAL SCHEMES PUT FORTH
IN THE US INSPECTION PAPER ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE,
WE WOULD PREFER THAT THE ALLIANCE SELECT AMONG VARIOUS
INSPECTION SYSTEMS, BEARING IN MIND THE CRITERIA OF

MILITARY/TECHNICAL EFFECTIVENESS, ACCEPTABILITY TO NATO,
AND POTENTIAL NEGOTIABILITY. FYI, AS SEEN FROM HERE, ONE
EFFECT OF THE UK INITIATIVE SEEMS TO BE TO DEPRIVE THE
SPC OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE ITS MANDATE TO DEVISE
AN ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATED INSPECTION. END FYI.

10. TAKING THE SPC APPROACH WILL OBVIOUSLY TAKE LONGER
THAN THE UK'S PROPOSED SHORTCUT, BUT WE THINK THIS IS
PREFERABLE. WE WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE NEGOTIATING WITH
THE PACT ON VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, UNTIL
THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE REDUCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED
MEASURES TO BE AGREED ARE GENERALLY CLEAR. ON THAT BASIS,
THE SPC SHOULD PROCEED TO ANALYZE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
AND INDICATE ITS PREFERENCE, LEAVING THE DETAILS OF
MANNING, BASING, TASKING, TIMING, AND OTHER SPECIFICS
TO THE TIME WHEN WE HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT IS TO BE
VERIFIED. RUSH

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